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Multimodal Infrastructure Investment Decision 
Making: An Institutional and Funding Perspective
by Travis P. Dunn and Joseph M. Sussman
This	paper	presents	a	case	analysis	of	multimodalism	in	transportation	investment	decision	making	
as	 it	 relates	 to	other	policy	decisions,	 including	 infrastructure	ownership	structures,	geographic	
scales,	 and	 revenue	 sources.	 This	 allows	 a	 more	 complete	 understanding	 of	 multimodalism’s	
benefits,	drawbacks,	and	opportunities.	Private	infrastructure	developers	are	more	likely	to	evaluate	
and	 select	 investments	 in	 a	 multimodal	 fashion	 than	 either	 the	 public	 sector	 or	 public-private	
partnerships.	Decentralized,	municipal	decision	making	tends	to	reduce	barriers	to	multimodalism,	
although	with	reduced	capacity	 for	 large-scale	project	 implementation.	Experience	suggests	 that	
the	 source	 of	 transportation	 revenues	 is	 a	 less	 important	 influence	 on	 multimodalism	 than	 the	
organizations	collecting	them.
INTRODUCTION
In transportation, multimodalism	refers to a variety of concepts, ranging from the strategic to the 
operational. Meyer and Miller (2001) define multimodal planning as “the process of defining 
problems, identifying alternatives, evaluating potential solutions and selecting preferred actions that 
meet community goals in a manner that includes all feasible transportation modes.” The alternate 
approach, unimodalism, involves budget-setting, analysis, and project selection for highways, 
mass transit, railroads, and other transportation investments in isolation from one another. On an 
operational level, multimodalism refers to journeys in which passenger or freight use multiple 
modes of transport under a single fare or contract (i.e., intermodal). This paper focuses on the 
strategic level, investigating the prospects for and consequences of multimodalism in transportation 
infrastructure investment analysis and decision making. In this context, multimodalism can be 
defined as the integrated evaluation and selection of projects and programs, funded from a single 
budget, with competition across modes for resources. 
A multimodal approach to investment decisions is of ongoing interest in the transportation 
community. Broadly speaking, the potential benefits include more effective, efficient investments 
characterized by a reduction in the level of public resources necessary for transportation 
infrastructure while maintaining or improving the level of service of the transportation system as a 
whole. Still, multimodalism faces a number of institutional barriers: implementation in practice is 
sparse, attributable to the inertia of legacy decision-making processes, reluctance to compete across 
modes for resources, and lack of effective tools for conducting multimodal evaluations. As a result, 
in many places, modally-oriented agencies continue to receive independent budgets and conduct 
project evaluations to decide investments for only their mode.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the current status of and prospects for multimodalism 
in infrastructure investment decision making, using Portugal as the case context. Although the 
conclusions are tempered in recognition of the limited applicability of a single case, Portugal 
nonetheless offers a range of experiences (and experiments) that inform the analysis. Specifically, 
multimodalism is considered in combination with three other dimensions of the framework within 
which transportation infrastructure investment strategies are developed: ownership structures, 
geographic scales, and revenue sources.
This paper begins with a review of the literature and current multimodal practices. Next, a 
multidimensional strategy development framework is presented, within which multimodalism can 
be considered, along with a summary of the state-of-the practice of transportation infrastructure 
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investment decision making in Portugal. Next, the relationships between multimodalism and three 
other dimensions of the strategy development framework are analyzed. Finally, based on this 
multidimensional analysis, a more complete assessment is presented of the benefits of, barriers to, 
and prospects for increasing multimodalism.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Literature to date presents both the benefits of and barriers to multimodalism in transportation 
infrastructure investment decision-making processes. Transportation planners have conjectured that 
there are benefits to integration not just across modes but also across sectors in the development of 
investment strategies. For example, Hatzopoulou and Miller (2008) identify multi-sectoral policies 
whose “impacts extend beyond the transport sector itself to other sectors such as environment, 
health, and education” as a “common denominator” among sustainable transportation plans at the 
metropolitan and regional scales. By identifying a broader range of policy objectives outside of 
transportation that are related to transportation investments, decisions will not only be more efficient, 
but they will also more closely reflect the collective preferences of the population of infrastructure 
customers. Kanafani (2008) succinctly summarizes the key potential cost of unimodalism—“many 
actors are each optimizing their own objectives with no one looking after the whole system”— 
implying that multimodalism is equivalent to system-wide optimization of resource allocation.
However, integration of modes (and sectors) for investment decision making is not without 
its costs. Stough and Rietveld (1997) argue that the theoretical benefits of greater integration are 
counteracted by the reality that broader participation also brings more conflict to the decision-making 
process, in turn slowing the process and increasing its costs. Many contemporary transportation 
institutions reflect the rigid, centralized character of organizations following the “Fordist” model of 
industrial growth characterized by specialization and standardization of internal processes and mass 
production. Consequently, institutions are averse to change and competition. In response, Stough 
and Rietveld (1997) advocate a research agenda that focuses on improving the decision tools that 
reduce the costs of integration.
Another consequence of integration is greater competition. If multiple, previously un-integrated 
unimodal transportation organizations and other government agencies are asked to compete for 
funds from a single source, representatives of each organization must respond by developing and 
presenting compelling cases for each individual project or program, leading to greater competition 
across all modes for limited resources. Jones and Lucas (2000), for example, describe just such a 
“single capital pot” scheme operating on a pilot basis in Scotland, in which the central government 
grants resources to local authorities to spend as they see fit. The scheme “has led to a sharp drop 
in transport expenditures in some areas. Hence, transport schemes will need to demonstrate (and 
so be designed to achieve) wider social and economic benefits, if they are to compete successfully 
for limited resources.” The benefits of such integration for the public could be substantial: greater 
competition among uses of public resources could lead to more efficient allocation decisions. 
However, transportation industry stakeholders advocating for integrated strategy development, such 
as those in the Scotland case, would likely not ex-ante expect, and they certainly would not ex-post 
favor, such a decline in transportation spending.
Kanafani (2008) concedes that although “transportation planners have always accepted the 
integration of modes as a sound principle… daunting challenges prevent its realization.” The 
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO 2004) cited unimodal institutional structures as a 
key barrier to the potential for more multimodal strategy development: “There are relatively few 
instances in which decisions involve trade-offs among the various transportation modes to meet 
passenger and freight mobility needs.” GAO (2004) points to the conflict between the language of 
federal legislation which “emphasizes the goal” of intermodal planning and the “reality of federal 
funding structures,” which are oriented uni-modally.
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In the following sections, a framework is presented for more deeply examining multimodalism, 
focusing on its relationship with other dimensions of strategy development. Next, the Portuguese 
transportation sector is characterized and used as the basis for an analysis of multimodalism. Finally, 
the ways in which multimodalism relates to other dimensions of strategy development are identified, 
offering a more complete picture of the potential benefits of and barriers to multimodalism. This 
explicit linkage to other dimensions of strategy development expands the analysis of multimodalism 
typically seen in transportation literature.
STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK
The lens adopted for this analysis is the multi-dimensional strategy	 development	 framework 
developed by Dunn (2010). Table 1 lists and provides examples of seven of those dimensions: 
ownership structure, degree of modal integration, degree of sectoral integration, revenue type, 
revenue quantity, resource allocation technique, and geographic scale. These dimensions are used to 
characterize the way a set of organizations in a defined context strategically manages a transportation 
infrastructure system. Note that “degree	of	modal	integration” is just one of seven dimensions used 
to characterize a strategy development framework.
Table 1: Dimensions of a Strategy Development Framework
Dimensions of Strategy
Development Framework Examples
In
st
itu
tio
na
l A
rc
hi
te
ct
ur
e
Ownership Structure
Government agencies or state-owned enterprises
Public-private partnerships for infrastructure delivery
Private infrastructure companies or cooperatives
Degree of Modal 
Integration
Uni-modal	state-owned	enterprises	(e.g.,	independent	highway	and	
rail	companies)
Multimodal	agencies	with	integrated	funding	sources
Degree of Sectoral 
Integration
Uni-sectoral agencies with autonomy
Multi-sectoral agencies or highly collaborative uni-sectoral 
agencies
D
ec
is
io
n-
m
ak
in
g 
Pr
oc
es
s Revenue Type
Direct user fees (e.g., tolls, fares, parking fees)
Indirect user fees (e.g., fuel taxes, vehicle sales & ownership taxes, 
licensing fees)
Beneficiary fees (e.g., land-value capture taxes)
General taxes (e.g., sales, income, and property taxes)
Revenue Quantity High vs. medium vs. low tax and/or toll rates
Resource Allocation
Political negotiation, e.g., within deliberative legislative bodies or 
executive administrations
Information-driven ranking of projects via benefit-cost analysis 
and net present value analysis.
Formula-based allocations (e.g., based on population, income, 
travel demand)
Geographic Scale of Control
National
State
Metropolitan
Local/Municipal
Multimodal Infrastructure
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One way to illustrate the strategy development framework for a particular context is with a radar 
chart, as illustrated in Figure 1. The analyst selects values or combinations of values along each 
dimension to characterize a particular transportation context. For example, the strategy development 
framework for Portugal’s system of highways could be characterized as a combination of nationally-
scaled state-owned enterprises and concessions (managed and operated by private consortia under 
long-term contracts with the state) that makes investment decisions unimodally using a mixture 
of user fees and general tax revenue of medium quantity, allocated largely on the basis of net 
present value analysis. Of course many of the discrete values selected along the dimensions are 
simplifications, but the purpose of this exercise is to characterize in	combination various dimensions 
of the investment strategy development framework. Next, the existing strategy development 
framework for Portugal is discussed, with particular emphasis on the degree of multimodalism.
STATE OF THE PRACTICE IN PORTUGAL2
Portugal’s transportation system includes an extensive highway network; a conventional rail 
network providing regional (commuter), long-distance intercity, and international passenger service 
as well as freight service; urban public transit systems, including bus, light rail, subway, and ferry; 
several airports, including a major international hub in Lisbon; container ports in Lisbon and Sines; 
and a proposed high-speed rail (HSR) network that will first connect Lisbon with Madrid and, later, 
Lisbon with Porto (see Figure 2 for reference map of Portugal).
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Figure 1: Example Representation of a Strategy Development Framework1
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Figure 3 illustrates the institutional architecture 
that currently oversees Portugal’s transportation 
infrastructure as a four-level hierarchy. The levels, from 
top to bottom, are:
•	 The central government, including the Council of 
 Ministers, Ministry of Public Works & Transportation 
 and Communications (MOPTC), and the MOPTC’s 
 constituent Secretariats of State
•	 Regulatory entities
•	 State-owned enterprises (SOEs)
•	 Private concessionaires
Not represented are municipal governments, which own 
and operate local transportation infrastructure (e.g., 
streets and sidewalks) and, in the case of some smaller 
municipalities, bus transit systems. Regional authorities 
are also omitted, whose powers to date are not clearly 
defined.
Most transportation infrastructure investments 
are developed and decided at the highest levels of 
government (within the legislative National Assembly 
and the Council of Ministers, which is the cabinet of 
the executive branch) and within the MOPTC itself, 
while independent agencies develop and enforce service, 
economic, and safety regulations for each transportation 
mode. Resource allocation decisions result from 
negotiations within the government; these negotiations 
serve as a de facto multimodal investment allocation 
mechanism, but are based on preservation of existing 
budgets and needs assessments, which are formulated 
independently by stakeholders within each mode.
The MOPTC itself is bifurcated, with one secretary of state for highways and aviation and 
another for railways and urban public transit.5 The SOEs acting on behalf of the government to 
deliver transportation infrastructure investments are unimodal in character, with few formal 
connections to one another. For example, the 2000 National Road Plan (Plano Rodoviária Nacional, 
or PRN 2000) was developed by the principal highway agency Estradas de Portugal (EP), while the 
planned HSR network was developed by the HSR company Rede de Alta Velocidade (RAVE) (EP 
2000 and RAVE 2008). There were no explicitly multimodal considerations either in the decision to 
develop the plans or in the ongoing execution of the plans.
Strategic Orientations (Orientações Estratégicas) were produced by the MOPTC, with one 
document corresponding to each mode: rail, road, airports, and ports/logistics (MOPTC 2006a; EP 
2000; MOPTC 2006b; MOPTC 2007, respectively). The Strategic Orientation for rail characterizes 
highways largely as a competitor and refers to policies that promote highway use as a “threat.” 
Instead, the rail sector endorses policies that favor rail over road-based travel, including pricing as a 
means of improving the attractiveness of rail to customers. For its part, the PRN 2000, which serves 
as the Strategic Orientation for highways, does not even mention rail.
The best prospects for consideration of multimodal tradeoffs in infrastructure investment 
decision making under the current framework are within the very highest levels of government and 
through informal connections of the unimodal organizations. Even these opportunities have, in many 
cases, disappeared due to the severing of ties, for financial reasons, between the government and the 
modally-oriented SOEs. In late 2007, for instance, EP was converted into an autonomous company 
and empowered to fulfill its public objective of building road infrastructure through concession 
Figure 2: Reference Map of Portugal3
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Figure 3: Institutional Architecture of Portuguese Transportation System4
agreements with private companies and through borrowing (with the implicit backing of the state). 
Likewise, Rede Ferroviária Nacional (REFER), Portugal’s state-owned railway infrastructure 
company, fulfills its obligations to maintain rail infrastructure largely through borrowing instead of 
direct grants from the state.
There are several consequences of the unimodal nature of the current strategy development 
framework. First, SOEs lack a formal venue for multimodal planning or analysis of investment 
tradeoffs. Policy objectives, sometimes including specific investments, are dictated to the SOEs by 
the government; however, because many of the SOEs now operate “off budget,” they can pursue 
investments free from state-imposed budget constraints, which removes restraints on borrowing 
and spending. Deficits are funded by further loans, with the underlying asset values and implicit 
state backing as collateral. Another consequence is that SOEs will compete for the same traffic. For 
example, the motorways and the HSR network will connect many of the same points. With little 
population growth and a variety of options for intercity travelers, it may be difficult for demand 
to meet expectations, at least in the short- and medium-term, that could become problematic for 
repayment of funds borrowed for construction. Moreover, with investments pursued unimodally, 
there are limitations on the physical integration of infrastructure which could, in some contexts, 
provide not only for more efficient multimodal trip opportunities for customers but also more 
efficient, less costly network designs. Finally, by sending uncoordinated signals about infrastructure 
investment to the market, land development patterns will likely respond in unintended and difficult-
to-predict ways, compounding the challenge for design of policy in other areas such as environmental 
protection, land use, and economic development.
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A program of multimodal strategy development in Portugal would likely result in lower levels 
of investment in infrastructure. Instead of unimodal Strategic Orientations referring to the various 
other modes as competitors, multimodal strategy development would focus on opportunities for 
synergy and efficiency in the design of a multimodal network for passengers and freight. Intercity 
infrastructures would be less likely to compete for trips among modes, but instead would complement 
one another. The quantity of infrastructure developed and proposed would likely be reduced if for no 
other reason than the realization that redundant systems would be unable to draw sufficient traffic in 
order to be justified financially.
The prospects for more explicit and extensive multimodalism in the development of transportation 
infrastructure strategies for Portugal remain dim. Within the existing institutional architecture, the 
strongest prospects for multimodalism are within the government (the “top layer” of Figure 2). 
MOPTC, for example, has a strategic planning unit that produced a national, multimodal Strategic 
Transportation Plan (Plano Estratégico de Transporte, or PET) (MOPTC 2009). However, the plan 
is descriptive rather than prescriptive, indicating there is little opportunity within the planning unit 
to influence infrastructure investment decisions by the government in a multimodal direction. The 
other layers offer even fewer opportunities for modal integration: SOEs (e.g., EP and REFER) and 
regulatory agencies (e.g., InIR for highways and IMTT for railways and urban public transit) each 
have substantial institutional inertia and entrenched industry interests focused on a particular mode.
ANALYSIS OF MULTIMODALISM AS PART OF A MULTIDIMENSIONAL STRATEGY 
DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK
The focus of this section is to analyze benefits of and barriers to multimodalism in a multidimensional 
context, characterized by the strategy development framework presented in Figure 1. Of particular 
interest is the relationship between multimodalism and three of the other dimensions: ownership 
structure, geographic scale, and revenue sources. The benefits of and barriers to multimodalism vary 
depending upon how these other dimensions are defined.
Dimension 1: Ownership Structure
In the current framework of largely public ownership of infrastructure, in Portugal and beyond, 
multimodalism fares poorly. Public transit agencies invest in transit lines, highway agencies 
invest in highways, and rail agencies invest in rail, each typically using distinct revenue sources 
and budgeting mechanisms. However, involvement of the private sector has been notable at times 
throughout history—dating at least as far back as ancient Rome, whose imperial highways were 
maintained by private contractors (Laurence 1999). Involvement of private contractors remains 
common, but the spectrum of private involvement also includes relatively less common approaches 
such as:
•	 Fully private contracts, whereby a private infrastructure owner (supplier) provides a facility to 
private customers.
•	 Concession agreements, whereby a public owner leases a facility or right-of-way to a private 
builder for a defined period of time. The private builder finances, builds, and/or operates the 
facility in exchange for a revenue stream such as tolls or transfer payments based on traffic 
volumes, infrastructure availability, or other performance metrics.
The prospects for multimodalism under private ownership and under a concession approach to 
infrastructure development are discussed in the following paragraphs.
Private Ownership. A study of the long history of transportation reveals many attempts to provide 
infrastructure privately. Purely private efforts date as far back as the 18th and 19th century turnpikes 
of Great Britain and North America (Wood 1919). Railroads in the United States were also built 
as private ventures in the 19th century and largely remain private for freight, although it should be 
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noted that government land grants spurred their early development. Other contemporary examples 
of private infrastructure include the 1995 Dulles Greenway in Virginia, the 2000 Camino Columbia 
Toll Road in Texas, and the 2004 Las Vegas Monorail. Such examples, however, remain rare, and 
there are no examples of large-scale, purely private transportation infrastructure in Portugal.
The most prolific example of contemporary private infrastructure is the U.S. system of freight 
railroads. Although the bulk of railroad companies’ capital investments are devoted to rail-related 
facilities, substantial investments have been made in intermodal facilities. With over 21% of revenues 
derived from intermodal traffic (AAR 2010), freight railroads partner with logistics providers to 
deliver intermodal services for their customers, capitalizing on jointly-financed improvements to 
intermodal facilities. A recent example is the opening of the $370 million Union Pacific Intermodal 
Terminal in Joliet, Illinois (UP 2009).
Concessions. The concession approach represents an attempt at finding a public-private middle 
ground that can, in theory, maximize the benefits of both approaches while attempting to avoid 
the disadvantages of each. The basic structure is for the government to grant exclusive rights to 
a private entity to finance, build, and/or operate a portion of an infrastructure network for a fixed 
period of time and to collect tolls or other user fees from the facility. In exchange, the public sector 
sometimes receives an upfront payment for the lease of those rights or simply enjoys the delivery 
of infrastructure without drawing heavily on public budgets. Concessions have been in use for 
centuries, but recent examples abound in Western Europe, Asia, and Latin America. Portugal’s road 
concessions to private operators have grown substantially since the early 1990s. While Portuguese 
concession agreements in the rail sector have traditionally been with state-owned enterprises, the 
new HSR system will be concessioned to a private consortium.
Portuguese concessions vary by size and type of concession contract. The largest road contract 
is with Estradas de Portugal (EP), which until recently was the highway agency of the national 
government, but now is an SOE.6 Other than EP, there are 15 concession agreements in Portugal: 
eight “real toll” concessions and seven “shadow toll” concessions (in which the government, rather 
than motorists, compensates the concessionaire, as a function of traffic).7 In the rail sector, the 
government maintains a concession contract with state-owned REFER to manage the conventional 
rail infrastructure network, while private consortia are bidding to develop HSR. Information about 
select Portuguese concessions is summarized in Table 2.
Multimodalism and Ownership Structure. The experience of private ownership from the turnpike 
era, the railroads, and the modern era as well as of the recent concessions awarded in Portugal serves 
as the basis for judgment of multimodalism’s prospects.
There is little evidence that a concession-based approach would lead to more multimodalism 
than under public ownership. As demonstrated by the Portuguese case, concessions are being pursued 
independently for highways and rail, administered and financed independently by public partners, 
absent coordination across institutional boundaries. The private parties in concession agreements 
likewise see little incentive for multimodalism in their participation, especially since the public 
parties are likewise unimodal. Given that concessions are pursued largely as a means of financing 
projects that are planned and advocated by the public sector, with government retaining many of the 
downside revenue risks of investment, this result is not surprising.
By contrast, the prospects for multimodalism with privately provided infrastructure are mixed. 
Although devolving all transportation infrastructure matters to the private sector is unrealistic, 
private investors have historically pursued investments across modes, from toll roads to passenger 
and freight railroads to transit systems. Today, private multimodalism is perhaps best exemplified 
by the manner in which railroads interface with other modes, without bias, to support the shipment 
of goods for their customers. The private sector faces fewer political processes which allocate 
resources in a unimodal fashion, and it avoids altogether the complexity of assessing economic and 
social benefits of diverse projects across modes, focusing instead on a single metric: profitability. 
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Thus, one of the lessons to transfer from private experiences to the public sector and to concessions 
is that multimodalism is easier to implement when there is no modal bias, supported by a clear, 
simple evaluation framework for projects.
Table 2: Public-Private Partnerships in Portugal8
Type of Concession Name of Concession Length (km) Year Granted
Highways - Real Toll
Brisa 1,093 1972
Brisal 93 2004
Douro Litoral 53 2004
Atlântico 170 1998
AENOR 174 1998
Grande Lisboa 64 2004
Lusoponte 24 1998
Túnel de Marão9 30 2008
Highways - Shadow Toll
Grande Porto 64 1998
Costa da Prata 108 1998
Beiras Litoral e Alta 174 1998
Beira Interior 178 1998
Norte Litoral 119 1999
Interior Norte 158 1998
Algarve 134 1998
Highways – Other Estradas de Portugal (state-owned) 13,000 2007
Conventional Rail REFER (state-owned) 2,841 2008
High-Speed Rail TBD (private) 600 (planned) TBD
 
Dimension 2: Geographic Scale
Transportation infrastructure providers exist for a range of geographic scales, regardless of 
ownership structure. For example, U.S. freight railroads of varying sizes abound, from short lines to 
Class I companies. Concessions likewise range in size, for example, within Portugal from the 50-km 
Douro Litoral highway concession to the nearly 1,100-km Brisa highway concession. Public entities 
likewise exhibit a broad range of scales; consider, for example, the diversity of sizes and populations 
just among the 50 states. Identifying cases that reflect either “local” or “global” approaches to 
infrastructure provision is an exercise in relativity. In this section, the contrasting approaches of the 
European Union (EU), Portugal, and municipal governments are presented.
EU. To guide its investments in Portugal and other member countries, EU planners developed 
an explicitly multimodal Trans-European Transportation Network (TEN-T) as early as 1994 for 
consideration by the member states. The TEN-T comprises priority long-distance, cross-border 
axes and projects, including roads, rails, inland waterways, sea lanes, airports, ports, and a global 
navigation satellite system (GNSS) known as Galileo (EC 2005, EC 2003, EC 2001).10
One of the EU’s most effective tools for multimodal investment analysis and decision making 
is the European Investment Bank (EIB), Europe’s infrastructure bank. The EIB makes loans to a 
diverse portfolio of transportation and other infrastructure projects throughout the continent, basing 
all of its lending decisions on a streamlined process for project evaluation that incorporates technical, 
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social, economic, and environmental aspects, all considered similarly regardless of the project’s 
mode (e.g., EIB 2005). Although separate detailed guidelines exist for each mode, in recognition of 
the unique technical characteristics, the overall process is the same, resulting in multimodal lending 
decisions. For example, since 2005, the EIB has loaned the following to the Portuguese transport 
sector (EIB 2010):
•	 Highways: €2,269 million
•	 Conventional rail: €705 million
•	 High-speed rail: €600 million
•	 Aviation: €109 million
•	 Urban transit: €90 million
Despite its multimodal approach, the TEN-T faces several challenges. First, preferred 
investments at the EU scale do not necessarily align with domestic preferences. Portugal’s HSR 
network is one example: emphasizing transnational connections, the EU’s influence has led to 
prioritization of the Lisbon-Madrid HSR link over the domestic Lisbon-Porto link, despite the fact 
that Lisbon-Porto has an estimated IRR of 10.8%, compared with 5.9% for Lisbon-Madrid (RAVE 
2008). In addition, planners have been asked to balance a broad range of conflicting objectives in 
their development of a European-wide network for priority investment, including transportation 
efficiency, environmental protection, geographic fairness, and economic growth. As the geographic 
scale expands, incorporation of such diverse views from other sectors slows the process of planning 
and investing. Finally, member states are still free to make purely domestic investments that are not 
necessarily aligned with TEN-T. For example, along with high levels of EU investment in rail and 
highway projects, Portugal has continued a parallel program of similar domestic investments, of 
which debt service and operational requirements are now contributing to the country’s fiscal crisis.
Portugal. As discussed previously, Portugal’s domestic transportation infrastructure strategy 
is developed largely by the central government in a unimodal fashion. Examples of documents 
reflecting the central government’s deliberate strategy include the National Road Plan and the 
Strategic Orientations for the rail sector. The objective of each of these strategies is to improve the 
competitiveness of Portugal within the EU by creating better internal linkages and improving the 
quality of links that facilitate international trade, but they are not coordinated.
The machinations of domestic Portuguese politics dominate infrastructure strategy 
development, pitting forces within the central government against one another in a negotiation that 
results in familiar compromises about amounts of investments in transit, highway, rail, and other 
modes. However, these negotiations, which occur at the highest levels of government, begin with 
the previous year’s budget as the baseline for negotiation, with little meaningful consideration of 
appropriate budget levels across modes.
Municipal. Municipalities in Portugal are responsible for small-scale, local infrastructure, 
including streets, sidewalks, and in some cases local bus transit systems (in Lisbon and Porto, the 
municipalities at the center of the two largest metropolitan areas, bus and rail transit are provided 
by state-owned enterprises). The budgets for public works at the municipal scale are more flexible 
relative to the national budget, with municipalities making public works investments in a variety of 
modes, including transit, based on the level of need estimated by their technical staff, availability 
of revenues, and preferences of the local populations. Although the prospects of multimodalism 
are strong under this approach, the vast majority of municipal governments have very modest 
resources at their disposal and little capacity to invest broadly in, for example, multimodal intercity 
infrastructure.
Multimodalism and Geographic Scale. The prospects for effective multimodal investment in 
the Portuguese context are highest at the municipal level. This conforms with the observations 
of Stough and Reitveld (1997) that there are fewer barriers to integrated decision making within 
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smaller organizations (and, by extension, at smaller geographic scales). Interestingly, the EU also 
offers strong evidence of multimodal planning and decision making, bolstered by an infrastructure 
bank that uses a consistent methodology to support its lending decisions across modes.
Despite the potential benefits available of such multimodal decision making at both the local 
and supranational scales, the national government remains the dominant planner and investor of 
infrastructure in Portugal, with an institutional structure that is highly unimodal. Devolving authority 
and resources to local governments to make investment decisions may result in more multimodal 
decision making, but it may also result in the diversion of resources away from transportation. By 
the same token, ceding more authority to the EU for infrastructure decisions may result in more 
multimodalism, but risks allocating more resources to transnational projects that are of lesser benefit 
for Portugal itself.
Dimension 3: Revenue Sources
The final dimension to consider is revenues sources. Two types of revenues are described, categorized 
broadly as general taxes, which are paid by all members of society, and user fees, which are charged 
either directly or indirectly to transportation customers roughly in proportion to their usage.
General Taxes. Due to the broad array of general tax mechanisms in use by governments, it 
is impossible to identify a convincing linkage between any particular taxation approach and 
multimodalism (or lack thereof). In Portugal, a diverse array of general taxes is collected by 
municipal governments and by the national government, including taxes on income, sales, fuel, and 
property. Many of these taxes accrue to the general budget, which is used to support a variety of 
infrastructure projects through the largely unimodal processes outlined above.
Nonetheless, there are many counter examples of multimodal investment decision processes 
that use general tax-derived revenues, including the EU and municipal governments that were 
described in the previous section. EU revenues consist of taxes on commodities such as sugar, EU-
wide value-added taxes, and contributions from each member state, while municipal governments 
in Portugal derive their budgets from general taxes on income and property.
User Fees. In Portugal, as in many other countries, much of the revenue available for transportation 
investment is derived from user fees, both direct and indirect. Below, the user fees and their ultimate 
uses are summarized.
•	 Road tolls. Portuguese motorists pay tolls for use of many of the country’s motorways, with 
revenues devoted to the highway sector. Specifically, revenues are allocated to concession 
operators in order to cover their operational costs, debt service, and re-investment in the 
highway system.
•	 Rail fares. As with highway tolls, fares paid by rail users in Portugal are devoted to the operators 
who collect them. The vast majority of passenger service is operated by Comboios de Portugal 
(CP), a state-owned enterprise, with a few smaller private participants.
•	 Rail access fees. Rail operators such as CP and the private passenger and freight operators 
must pay fees to access the track to the infrastructure manager REFER. These revenues are 
devoted entirely to REFER for management of, maintenance for, and capital investment in the 
rail infrastructure system.
•	 Transit fares. As with rail fares, collections from passengers are devoted fully to the transit 
operators.
•	 Fuel taxes. Approximately 1/6 of fuel tax revenues are remitted to Estradas de Portugal in 
exchange for its maintenance of the highway system. The remainder accrues to the general 
budget.
Generally speaking, user fees are “ring-fenced” to the mode from which they are collected, not 
only in Portugal but around the world. The U.S. Highway Trust Fund is another example; although a 
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small percentage is devoted to transit projects, the vast majority of highway user fees are reinvested 
in highways. A notable exception is London, where a substantial share of congestion-charging 
revenues are devoted to transit improvements.
Multimodalism and Revenue Sources. Although logic suggests that general tax revenues should 
be easier to apportion than user fees in a multimodal fashion, examples and counter examples of 
multimodalism exist for transportation budgets composed of both user fees and general tax revenues. 
Consequently, the question of how revenues are collected becomes less important than who collects 
them. Modally-oriented agencies or companies are unlikely to share their user-fee proceeds with 
others, resulting in modal silos. Similarly, general fund revenues that are apportioned to modally 
oriented agencies according to formulas or historical budget shares, without serious cross-modal 
analyses, likewise lose the potential benefits of true multimodalism.
CONCLUSIONS
The theoretical impacts of multimodalism include benefits for providers and customers of 
transportation infrastructure alike, including passengers and freight. From the point of view of 
providers, more efficient investments are possible, while for customers more efficient travel options 
become available. These benefits (competition and more efficient allocation of resources) are, 
paradoxically, also barriers to integration. The involvement of greater numbers of stakeholders 
leads to competition for scarce resources, which is generally perceived as a threat by existing 
organizations. Advocates for multimodalism risk losing the support of constituent modal interests, 
which could result in further setbacks for the multimodalism objective. Moreover, the potential 
exists in this environment not only for competition across modes but also across sectors, leading 
to a potential decline in resources made available for transportation overall. Even if successfully 
implemented, integrated multimodal decision making entails higher costs of coordination.
Given these barriers, multimodalism can be more deeply examined and carefully pursued 
in parallel with other dimensions of strategy development. For example, along the dimension of 
ownership structure, more private involvement in infrastructure development could lead to more 
multimodal decision-making approaches. Because private developers are interested in the financial 
performance of investments, regardless of mode, they are more likely to consider trade-offs across 
modes before investing. This is not often the case in the public sector, where the relatively simple 
decision metric of profit is unavailable. That said, attempts to involve the private sector through 
concession agreements (i.e., public-private partnerships) will not necessarily lead to higher levels 
of multimodalism, because concessions are largely used as financing tools for investments that are 
already planned and decided unimodally by the public sector. Instead, the multimodal experiences 
observed in the private sector suggest the need for development of integrated, multimodal evaluation 
tools for the public sector (along the lines of those that use profit as a decision metric) that can serve 
as clear, simple, convincing inputs to the decision-making process, thereby eliminating modal bias.
Along the dimension of geographic scale, in Portugal, multimodalism is more feasible and more 
likely to deliver benefits at geographic scales other	than	the national scale. Decentralization has the 
effect of reducing the number of participants, thereby reducing the potential points of conflict and 
competition for resources. Interestingly, at the same time, the EU’s pursuit of multimodal planning 
and investment along with the EIB’s multimodal investment appraisal processes offer another 
avenue for greater multimodalism in Portugal at the supranational scale. However, allowing greater 
control by the EU risks overlooking important domestic needs, while local governments if given 
greater authority, may lack the ability to assess large-scale projects, especially at an intercity scale.
Finally, along the dimension of revenue sources, although multimodalism requires a single 
budget from which to make investment decisions, experience suggests the source of those 
funds (general tax revenue vs. user fee revenues) does not necessarily influence the degree of 
multimodalism. As observed in Portugal and elsewhere, the “user pay” principle remains strong: 
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revenues collected from users of a particular mode tend to be reinvested in that same mode, whether 
for highways, transit, or rail. Nevertheless, all forms of passenger transportation (and many forms 
of freight transport) receive subsidies from general revenues. As a result, the relative influx of funds 
from a particular mode is ultimately less relevant for multimodalism than the design of multimodal 
funding mechanisms for distributing revenues, regardless of source, that are used to subsidize all 
modes.
The conclusions presented here are based on the observations of multimodal planning and 
investment decision making in Portugal and within the EU, supported by Portugal’s experience 
with concession agreements, multi-level planning and investing, and various types of transportation 
revenue, with reference to other historical cases and examples where appropriate. Although the 
case of Portugal is admittedly limited, it offers a rich platform to consider the relationship between 
multimodalism and other dimensions of transportation infrastructure strategy development. 
Transportation stakeholders advocating for greater multimodalism in project evaluation and decision 
making should not view multimodalism as a topic in isolation, but rather as one dimension among 
many others in the strategy development framework that governs their transportation system. By 
examining the other dimensions, including the three discussed here (ownership structure, geographic 
scale, and revenue sources), diagnoses of barriers to multimodalism become more precise, while 
prescriptions for implementing multimodalism are better informed by recognizing the complexity 
of strategy development more broadly.
Endnotes
1. Abbreviations: Net present value (NPV), benefit-cost analysis (BCA), internal rate of return 
(IRR).
2. The discussion in this section is based largely on interviews cited at the end of the References 
section.
3. Reproduced from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency World	Fact	Book	(public domain), 2010.
4. Reproduced from Dunn (2010).
5. This bifurcation is not uncommon among government transportation departments and 
ministries—for example, the U.S. DOT has 11 distinct modal administrations.
6. EP relies on fuel taxes and heavy borrowing to meet the requirements specified in its agreement 
with the state to maintain all existing intercity highway infrastructure in Portugal and to construct 
new links as directed by the government and in accordance with the 2000 National Road Plan.
7. The government and its private partners are currently in the process of developing nine new 
concession agreements.
8. Various sources: APCAP (2008), Mota Engil (2007), RAVE (2008), REFER (2006)
9. Under construction as of 2010.
10. Maps of the Trans-European Transportation Network (TEN-T) are available from the sources 
cited as well as the TEN-T website: http://ec.europa.eu/transport/infrastructure/index_en.htm.
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